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Article 2

AESTHETIC NONDISCRIMINATION & FAIR
USE
BRIAN L. FRYE*
ABSTRACT
While courts do not consider the aesthetic value of an element of a
work in determining whether it is protected by copyright, they do consider
the aesthetic value of the use of a copyrighted element of a work in
determining whether that use is a fair use. This asymmetry improperly and
inefficiently discriminates in favor of copyright protection and against fair
use. Moreover, the fair use transformativeness inquiry discriminates against
marginalized authors, because courts are less likely to appreciate the
aesthetic value of their uses of copyrighted works.
Courts should apply the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle to
both copyright and fair use. In other words, “transformative” should just
mean “different,” and courts evaluating a fair use claim should simply ask
whether the use changes the copyrighted work in any way, including
context, and should not ask whether that change is substantial or valuable.
While this would substantially narrow the scope of the derivative works
right, it would almost certainly increase social welfare by encouraging the
production of derivative works without materially affecting the incentives
to create works of authorship.
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INTRODUCTION
A well-worn Latin adage observes, “De gustibus non est
disputandum,” or, roughly translated, “There’s no accounting for taste.”1
Economists typically use the adage to express the principle that social
welfare depends on individual preferences, so government should help
people maximize their individual preferences.2 In other words, the de
gustibus principle of economics holds that government should be agnostic
about the relative merit of individual preferences. As some might say,
“Different strokes for different folks.”3
More than 100 years ago, United States copyright law incorporated
a version of the de gustibus principle when the Supreme Court held that
copyright can protect any original work of authorship, irrespective of its
aesthetic value.4 This principle eventually became known as the aesthetic
nondiscrimination doctrine, which provides that the aesthetic value of a
work of authorship is irrelevant to whether it is original and protected by
copyright.5
But that does not mean that aesthetic value is irrelevant to
copyright law. The most important defense to copyright infringement is the
fair use doctrine, which provides that certain uses of copyrighted works are
non-infringing fair uses.6 Specifically, “transformative” uses of a work of
authorship are typically non-infringing fair uses, and courts determine
whether a particular use of a copyrighted work is transformative by asking
whether it “adds something new” to the original work and thereby provides
a “social benefit.”7 So, in practice, the transformativeness inquiry requires
courts to evaluate the aesthetic value of the allegedly infringing use.
This article argues that the aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine
should apply to both copyright protection and fair use. If originality does
1. The literal translation of the adage is “about tastes, it should not be disputed.”
2. But see George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum,
67 AM. ECON. REV. 76, 76 (1977) (arguing that most people have similar preferences).
3. Cf. Diff’rent Strokes (NBC television broadcast Nov. 3, 1978).
4. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903).
5. See Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 813 (2005)
(describing the effect of aesthetic discrimination).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
7. Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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not depend on aesthetic value, neither should transformativeness. Of course,
applying the aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine to fair use would
significantly reduce the scope of the derivative works right. However, it
would almost certainly increase public welfare because the derivative
works right is inefficiently broad, dramatically limiting the production of
derivative works without materially increasing the incentive to create works
of authorship.
The effects of the compulsory license for making sound recordings
of musical works suggest that narrowing the scope of the derivative works
right in this way would increase public welfare. The compulsory license
enables anyone to create and distribute a sound recording of a copyrighted
musical work without permission in exchange for a statutory royalty, but it
does not permit the creation of derivative musical works without
permission.8 As a consequence, musicians create many cover versions of
musical works but avoid creating derivative musical works. In other words,
the compulsory license encourages the creation of one kind of derivative
work—cover songs—and discourages the creation of another kind of
derivative work: homages.
Cover songs clearly increase social welfare. The public demands
cover songs, and the consumption of one version of a musical work does
not decrease demand for alternative versions of that musical work. On the
contrary, popular covers tend to increase demand for both the musical work
and other versions of the musical work.9 Presumably, an increase in the
number of homages would increase public welfare in a similar fashion. The
public’s demand for cover songs reflects its preference for familiar works
of authorship, which the derivative works right discourages.
Moreover, reducing the scope of the derivative works right would
not materially affect the incentive to create works of authorship, because
the right does not provide a salient incentive to marginal authors. The
derivative works right is valuable only if the copyrighted work is valuable.
But authors cannot predict the value of a work of authorship before creating
it and distributing it to the public. In other words, the value of the derivative
works right is indeterminate until after the underlying work of authorship is
already created, and a right of indeterminate value cannot provide a salient
incentive. This suggests that limiting the scope of the derivative works right
would increase public welfare without materially decreasing the incentive
to create works of authorship.

8. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012).
9. Douglas Campbell Rennie, This Book Is A Movie: The Faithful Adaptation as a
Benchmark for Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Works in Different Media, 93 OR. L.
REV. 49, 63–64 (2014).
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I. THE ORIGIN OF THE AESTHETIC NONDISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE
The so-called aesthetic nondiscrimination principle provides that
courts cannot consider the aesthetic value of a work of authorship in
determining whether it is protected by copyright.10 It is based on Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Company, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that copyright can and should protect any original work of authorship,
regardless of its aesthetic value.11
In 1898, Benjamin Wallace, the owner of a travelling circus called
the “Great Wallace Shows,” hired the Courier Lithographing Company of
Buffalo, New York to design and print chromolithograph posters for the
circus.12 Courier filed copyright registrations on three posters with the
Librarian of Congress:
●
“Spectacular Ballet Design,” which depicted “a
line of a dozen or more figures of females in ballet
costumes of the most flashy style”13 with the legend,
“Great Wallace Shows grand spectacular ballet costumed
& presented exactly as in grand opera. Led by the
celebrated Sisters Maccari, Hulda, Adele & Amelia
premiere danseuses. A tremendous sensation costing a
fortune to produce”;14

10. Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 461–62 &
n.56 (2009) (“Professor Gorman called Holmes’ aesthetic nondiscrimination principle in
Bleistein “[o]ne of the more enduring observations in all of copyright.”) (quoting Robert A.
Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS, 1, 1 (2001)).
11. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903). See
generally Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The Story of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Company: Originality as a Vehicle for Copyright Inclusivity, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STORIES 77, 96 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2005); Zvi S. Rosen,
Reimagining Bleistein: Copyright for Advertisements in Historical Perspective, 59 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 347 (2012).
12. Courier Lithographing Co. v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 104 F. 993, 993 (6th
Cir. 1900) rev’d sub nom. Bleistein, 188 U.S. 239. Lithography is a method of printing that
uses water-retaining or “hydrophilic” and water-repelling or “hydrophobic” media applied to
a flat plate in order to produce a monochrome image. See Lithography, ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/lithography [https://perma.cc/S28Q-47UD].
Chromolithography is a method of printing that uses multiple lithographic plates to produce
a multi-colored image. See id.
13. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 98 F. 608, 609 (C.C.D. Ky. 1899) aff’d
sub nom. Courier Lithographing Co., 104 F. 993 rev’d sub nom. Bleistein, 188 U.S. 239.
14. Courier Lithographing Company, Spectacular Ballet Design (1918), available at
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2007684718/ [https://perma.cc/G227-J4WJ].
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●
“Stirk Family Design,” which depicted “a series of
representations of fancy or trick bicycle riding”15 with the
legend, “The renowned Stirk Family, whose ‘fame folds in
the orb ‘o this Earth.’ The glass of fashion and the mold of
form. The highest of high class acts. Marvelous and
original evolutions by adult and juvenile experts. An
enormously expensive feature of the world’s best show.”;16
and
●
“Statuary Act Design,” which depicted “pictures of
certain statuary”17 with the legend, “The classic, chaste,
and culminating living triumphs of imitative art. 8 lovely
ladies of faultless form posing upon a great revolving
pedestal in bewitching, perfect, breathing reproductions of
famous historical incidents & the crowning features of the
world’s most noted studios and galleries.”18
On April 11, 1898, Courier shipped a “large number of prints” of
each poster to Wallace in Peru, Indiana.19 When Wallace ran out of posters,
he hired the Donaldson Lithographing Company of Newport, Kentucky to
create less expensive monochrome electrotype reproductions of the
posters.20 Courier and six of its employees, including George Bleistein,
filed a copyright infringement action against Donaldson, claiming $12,000
in damages.21
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict
on the ground that the posters were “neither ‘pictorial illustrations’ nor
‘works connected with the fine arts,’ within the meaning of [the Copyright
Act].”22 The appeals court affirmed, holding that copyright does not and
should not protect advertisements:
15. Bleistein 98 F. at 609.
16. Courier Lithographing Company, Stirk Family Design (1918), available at
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2007684720/ [https://perma.cc/E9WK-N87Z].
17. Bleistein 98 F. at 609. “Spectacular Ballet Design” and “Stirk Family Design”
were registered on April 11, 1898, and “Statuary Act Design” was registered on April 18,
1898. Courier Lithographing Co. v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 104 F. 993, 993 (6th Cir.
1900), rev’d sub nom. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
18. Courier Lithographing Company, Statuary Act Design (1918), available at
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2007684719/ [https://perma.cc/DJA5-H856].
19. Courier Lithographing Co., 104 F. at 993.
20. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 11.
21. Bleistein, 98 F. at 608. The plaintiffs were George Bleistein, John W. Bridgman,
John A. Rudolph, Ansley Wilcox, Gerritt B. Lansing, and Edwin Fleming, doing business as
the Courier Lithographing Company. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 239.
22. Bleistein, 98 F. at 608.
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What we hold is this: that if a chromo, lithograph, or other
print, engraving, or picture has no other use than that of a
mere advertisement, and no value aside from this function,
it would not be promotive of the useful arts, within the
meaning of the constitutional provision, to protect the
“author” in the exclusive use thereof, and the copyright
statute should not be construed as including such a
publication, if any other construction is admissible.23
But the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Copyright Act
can and should protect all “pictorial illustrations,” including
advertisements.24 As Justice Holmes’s majority opinion observed:
A picture is none the less a picture, and none the less a
subject of copyright, that it is used for an advertisement.
And if pictures may be used to advertise soap, or the
theatre, or monthly magazines, as they are, they may be
used to advertise a circus. Of course, the ballet is as
legitimate a subject for illustration as any other. A rule
cannot be laid down that would excommunicate the
paintings of Degas.25
Holmes explained that copyright protection should not depend on
the aesthetic value of a work because courts cannot reliably or objectively
determine aesthetic value:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of
genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very
novelty would make them repulsive until the public had
learned the new language in which their author spoke. It
may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the
etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have
been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the
23. Courier Lithographing Co., 104 F. at 996.
24. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250–51.
25. Id. at 251. A majority of the works of French Impressionist painter Edgar Degas
(1834–1917) depict dancers, especially ballet dancers, like those depicted in the poster
“Spectacular Ballet Design.” See, e.g., Paul Trachtman, Degas and His Dancers,
SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Apr. 2003), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/degasand-his-dancers-79455990/?no-ist [https://perma.cc/8BK6-GE5B].
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other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which
appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if
they command the interest of any public, they have a
commercial value,—it would be bold to say that they have
not an aesthetic and educational value,—and the taste of
any public is not to be treated with contempt. It is an
ultimate fact for the moment, whatever may be our hopes
for a change. That these pictures had their worth and their
success is sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce
them without regard to the plaintiffs’ rights. We are of
opinion that there was evidence that the plaintiffs have
rights entitled to the protection of the law.26
Essentially, Bleistein adopted a version of the de gustibus principle,
holding that copyright should protect any original work of authorship,
irrespective of its aesthetic value, because aesthetic value is inescapably
subjective. If judges were to consider the aesthetic value of a work in
determining whether it is protected by copyright, their own subjective
preferences could prevent them from recognizing both the objective
aesthetic value of the work and its subjective aesthetic value to others.
Of course, the Court tried to hedge by holding that judges should
not consider the aesthetic value of a work “outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits.”27 And what were those narrow and obvious limits?
The Court did not explain. Unsurprisingly, they soon proved non-obvious
and, as a consequence, became quite narrow indeed. In practice, Bleistein
made aesthetic value irrelevant to copyright.
Justice Harlan dissented, adopting the appellate court’s reasoning
as his own and adding:
The clause of the Constitution giving Congress power to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited terms to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective works and discoveries, does not, as
I think, embrace a mere advertisement of a circus.28
While Harlan argued that copyright does not and should not protect
advertisements, he did not explain why. That is unfortunate because there
are multiple reasons for taking that position. Presumably, Harlan believed
that copyright requires aesthetic value. But one could also argue that
26. Id. at 251–52 (internal citations omitted).
27. Id. at 251.
28. Id. at 253 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Justice McKenna joined Harlan’s dissent).
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copyright in advertisements is unnecessary because businesses do not need
a copyright incentive to advertise their products.29
Copyright scholars eventually dubbed the version of the de gustibus
principle adopted in Bleistein the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle.30
Notably, while the federal courts have never used the term “aesthetic
nondiscrimination,” they immediately and uniformly adopted the aesthetic
nondiscrimination principle.31 For example, in Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme
Court held that copyright protected porcelain statuettes of male and female
dancers intended for use as lamp bases, without considering the aesthetic
value of the statuettes.32 But in his rather plaintive concurrence, Justice
Douglas observed that the majority’s application of the aesthetic
nondiscrimination doctrine made the effective scope of copyright protection
quite broad:
The Copyright Office has supplied us with a long list of
such articles which have been copyrighted—statuettes,
book ends, clocks, lamps, door knockers, candlesticks,
inkstands, chandeliers, piggy banks, sundials, salt and
pepper shakers, fish bowls, casseroles, and ash trays.
Perhaps these are all “writings” in the constitutional sense.
But to me, at least, they are not obviously so.33
In retrospect, Justice Douglas’s concerns were quite prescient. The
prevailing theory of copyright law is the economic theory, which holds that
copyright is justified because it solves market failures in works of
authorship by providing an incentive for marginal authors to create works
of authorship. As the Supreme Court has explicitly and repeatedly held, the
Intellectual Property Clause adopted the economic theory of copyright:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is

29. See also Rosen, supra note 11, at 374 (arguing that Holmes misinterpreted the
purpose of the Copyright Act of 1874, which was intended to protect works “connected to
the fine arts,” but not “pictorial illustrations”).
30. See Miller, supra note 10, at 477 n.123 (stating that Holmes’s refusal to consider
aesthetic merit “is known as the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle”).
31. See Robert A. Gorman, supra note 10, at 1 (characterizing the aesthetic
nondiscrimination principle as “[o]ne of the more enduring observations in all of
copyright.”).
32. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
33. Id. at 220–21 (Douglas, J., concurring) (Justice Black joined Douglas’s
concurrence).
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the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in “Science and useful Arts.”34
In other words, copyright protection provides an economic
incentive for authors to produce works of authorship and are justified
because the social cost of giving authors certain exclusive rights in their
works of authorship is less than the social benefit of the additional works of
authorship they produce. The aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine is
consistent with the economic theory of copyright insofar as it ensures that
the value of copyright protection depends on demand, rather than ideology.
The problem with the economic theory is that it encourages
policymakers to assume that more copyright necessarily means more works
of authorship. In fact, the salience of copyright protection to marginal
authors is obviously contextual. If the costs associated with the production
and distribution of a work of authorship are high, then copyright is typically
quite salient because rational marginal authors will not invest in the
production of those works unless they believe they can recover their costs.
But if the costs associated with the production and distribution of a work of
authorship are low, then copyright is typically not salient to rational
marginal authors because there are no costs to recover.
Historically, the costs associated with the production and
distribution of works of authorship were high, especially the cost of
distributing physical copies.35 But those costs have dramatically decreased,
especially because the marginal cost of distributing a digital copy of a work
of authorship is effectively zero.36 As a consequence, copyright has become
a much less salient incentive to many authors.37
However, the scope of copyright protection has not changed. As
Brad Greenberg has observed, copyright under the 1976 Act is like an
Oprah giveaway: everybody gets one.38 Every blog post, email, tweet,
status update, and selfie is protected by copyright, whether or not copyright
protection provided a salient incentive to its author.

34. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214 (2003) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954)).
35. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326–28 (1989).
36. See Alina Ng, When Users Are Authors: Authorship in the Age of Digital Media,
12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 853, 865 (2010).
37. Id. at 866.
38. See Brian L. Frye, Copyright as Charity, 39 NOVA L. REV. 343, 351–52 (2015).
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II. COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
When the Supreme Court adopted the aesthetic nondiscrimination
principle in Bleistein, it implicitly assumed that copyright protected works
of authorship as a whole.39 But the scope of copyright protection gradually
expanded to include certain discrete elements of a work of authorship as
well. For example, in 1930 the Second Circuit held that the copyright in a
dramatic work could protect not only the work as a whole, but also “a
separate scene,” “part of the dialogue,” or “an abstract of the whole.”40
Courts implicitly assumed that the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle
also applied to any element of a work that was protected by copyright.41 As
a consequence, copyright effectively protected any original element of a
work that could be characterized as an “expression” rather than an “idea.”42
The Copyright Act of 1976 amended the exclusive rights of
copyright owners to include the exclusive right “to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work.”43 In Harper & Row v. Nation, the
Supreme Court assumed that the derivative works right extended copyright
protection to each original element of a work as an independent work of
authorship.44 But it expressly declined to define “originality” for the
purpose of the Copyright Act.45 Six years later, in Feist v. Rural, the
Supreme Court defined an “original” element of a work of authorship as an
element that was “independently created by the author” and “possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity.”46 It also implicitly (and perhaps
unintentionally) held that every work of authorship is effectively a
compilation of theoretically discrete elements, some of which may be
original and protected by copyright, and others of which may not.47
39. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903).
40. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
44. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)
(holding that copyright does not prevent subsequent users from copying from a prior
author’s work those constituent elements that are not original—for example, quotations
borrowed under the rubric of fair use from other copyrighted works, facts, or materials in the
public domain—as long as such use does not unfairly appropriate the author’s original
contributions.”).
45. Id. (“Especially in the realm of factual narrative, the law is currently unsettled
regarding the ways in which uncopyrightable elements combine with the author’s original
contributions to form protected expression . . . . We need not reach these issues, however, as
The Nation has admitted to lifting verbatim quotes of the author’s original language totaling
between 300 and 400 words and constituting some 13% of The Nation article.”) (internal
citations omitted).
46. Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
47. Id.
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A. Feist v. Rural
Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. provided telephone service
to subscribers in parts of northwest Kansas.48 Among other things, Rural
published and distributed a telephone directory that consisted of white
pages, which listed all of Rural’s subscribers in alphabetical order, and
yellow pages, which listed Rural’s commercial subscribers in alphabetical
order, along with advertisements purchased by certain subscribers.49
Feist Publications, Inc. published regional telephone directories that
also consisted of white pages and yellow pages.50 Feist decided to publish a
telephone directory covering a region that included many of Rural’s
subscribers and offered to license Rural’s white pages listings.51 Rural
refused to license its listings, so Feist copied them without permission.52
Rural filed a copyright infringement claim against Feist.53 The
district court granted summary judgment to Rural, holding that copyright
protects telephone directories, and the circuit court affirmed.54 But the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that copyright could not protect Rural’s
white pages listings because they lacked any original elements.55
B. Originality
The Supreme Court began by observing that copyright can only
protect original works of authorship. “The sine qua non of copyright is
originality. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to
the author.”56 The Court explained that “originality requires independent
creation plus a modicum of creativity.”57 Accordingly, copyright cannot
protect facts—including names, telephone numbers, and addresses—
because they are discovered, not created, by an author.58
48. Id. at 340.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (“There is no
doubt that Feist took from the white pages of Rural’s directory a substantial amount of
factual information. At a minimum, Feist copied the names, towns, and telephone numbers
of 1,309 of Rural’s subscribers.”). Rural proved that Feist copied its listings by showing that
Feist’s directory included four fictitious listings created by Rural for the purpose of proving
copying. Id. at 344.
53. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 216 (D. Kan. 1987).
54. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 916 F.2d 718, 718 (10th Cir. 1990);
Rural Tel. Serv. Co. 663 F. Supp. at 220.
55. Feist, 499 U.S. at 363–64.
56. Id. at 345 (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 346.
58. Id.
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However, copyright can protect a compilation of facts if the
ordering, selection, or arrangement of facts is original: “These choices as to
selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the
compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original
that Congress may protect such compilations through the copyright laws.”59
But the Supreme Court held that copyright could not protect Rural’s white
pages listings as a compilation of facts because the selection, ordering, and
arrangement of the listings required “no creativity whatsoever.”60
The practical effect of the creativity requirement was, and remains,
unclear. Feist repeatedly emphasized how little creativity is required for
copyright protection. But it neither defined creativity nor explained how to
determine whether an element of a work has enough creativity to qualify for
copyright protection. As a consequence, while Feist purported to increase
the requirements for copyright protection by requiring some degree of
creativity, it arguably decreased the requirements for copyright protection
by setting the creativity bar so low that almost anything qualifies, no matter
how trivial or banal.
After Feist, copyright cannot protect the decision to put white
pages listings in alphabetical order, but it can protect almost anything else.
The Feist Court itself suggested that copyright could protect Rural’s yellow
pages listings and even some elements of Rural’s white pages listings that
Feist did not copy.61 Circuit courts subsequently held that copyright also
protected an ethnic telephone directory and an automobile price guide.62
In addition to adopting the largely toothless creativity requirement
for originality, Feist also implied that copyright independently protects all
of the original elements of a work, rather than protecting the work as a
whole. As the Court observed:
The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean
that every element of the work may be protected.
Originality remains the sine qua non of copyright;

59. Id. at 348.
60. Id. at 362 (“The end product is a garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of
even the slightest trace of creativity.”).
61. Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (“Feist
appears to concede that Rural’s directory, considered as a whole, is subject to a valid
copyright because it contains some foreword text, as well as original material in its yellow
pages advertisements.”).
62. CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 74 (2d
Cir. 1994); Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Ent., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 511 (2d
Cir. 1991).
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accordingly, copyright protection may extend only to those
components of a work that are original to the author.63
The Court went on to explain, “To establish infringement, two
elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2)
copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”64 In other
words, copyright protects the original elements of a work, rather than the
work as a whole. Or rather, after Feist, every work of authorship is
implicitly a compilation of discrete elements, some of which may be
original and protected by copyright, and some of which may not.65
III. FAIR USE
One of the most important defenses to copyright infringement is the
fair use doctrine, which provides that certain prima facie infringing uses of
copyrighted works are non-infringing uses.66 Copyright and fair use have
always existed in tandem. Initially, fair use was a common law defense to
copyright infringement.67 When England created modern copyright by
passing the Statute of Anne, English courts eventually adopted a fair use
doctrine, which provided that copyright could not prevent certain
productive uses.68 And when Congress created United States copyright law
by passing the Copyright Act of 1790, United States courts also adopted a
fair use doctrine, which provided that fair use permits the use of a
copyrighted work without permission for the purpose of commentary or
criticism, unless the use supersedes the market for the original work.69
The purpose of the fair use doctrine is to balance the exclusive
rights of copyright owners against the right to make productive uses of
copyrighted works.70 In particular, the doctrine is intended to ensure that
copyright does not conflict with the First Amendment right to free speech.71
In theory, the fair use doctrine ensures that copyright owners can internalize
the positive externalities generated by the creation of a work of authorship
but cannot prevent others from using that work of authorship to generate

63.
64.
65.
1992).
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
(1984).
71.

Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
Id. at 361.
See, e.g., Computer Associates Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng.Rep. 489, 2Atk. 141 (1970) (No. 130).
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–20 (2003).
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additional positive externalities. But in practice, many courts found the fair
use doctrine difficult to apply.72
The Copyright Act of 1976 codified the fair use doctrine for the
first time, providing:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.73
As Congress explained, the purpose of codification was “to restate
the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it
in any way.”74 Of course, it is impossible to codify a common law doctrine
without changing it. Codification alone is a change, and it inevitably affects
the interpretation of the doctrine if only by obligating courts to consider the
specific language of the statute.
A. Toward a Fair Use Standard
In any case, codification alone did not clarify the application of the
fair use doctrine. Courts remained unsure how to determine whether
particular uses of copyrighted works were fair uses. In his seminal article,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, Judge Leval argued that the first fair use
factor—the “purpose and character of the use”—is the most important.75
According to Leval, the fair use doctrine is intended to encourage
productive uses of copyrighted works, so the fair use analysis should focus
72.
2001).
73.
74.
75.
(1990).

See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111
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on whether the allegedly infringing use is transformative or different from
the original use:
I believe the answer to the question of justification turns
primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged
use is transformative. The use must be productive and must
employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a
different purpose from the original.76
Leval also argued that mere difference is not enough and that a use
of a work is a transformative fair use only if it adds something new and
substantial to the original use:
A quotation of copyrighted material that merely repackages
or republishes the original is unlikely to pass the test; in
Justice Story’s words, it would merely “supersede the
objects” of the original. If, on the other hand, the secondary
use adds value to the original—if the quoted matter is used
as raw material, transformed in the creation of new
information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings—this is the very type of activity that the
fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of
society.77
In other words, according to Leval, a use of a copyrighted work is a
transformative fair use only if it adds something new and valuable to the
original use. Or rather, courts must consider the aesthetic value of a
secondary use in order to determine whether it is a fair use.
B. Campbell v. Acuff–Rose
The Supreme Court soon adopted Leval’s interpretation of the fair
use doctrine.78 In 1964, Roy Orbison and William Dees wrote the iconic
song “Oh, Pretty Woman” and assigned their rights to Acuff–Rose Music,
Inc. In 1989, Luther R. Campbell, Christopher Wongwon, Mark Ross, and
David Hobbs of the rap group 2 Live Crew offered to license “Oh, Pretty
Woman” in order to create a rap parody, but Acuff–Rose refused.79
Nevertheless, 2 Live Crew recorded and distributed a parody titled “Pretty

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 1111 (emphasis in the original).
Id.
See Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
Id. at 572–73.
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Woman.”80 Acuff–Rose filed a copyright infringement action.81 The district
court granted summary judgment to 2 Live Crew, holding that their parody
was a fair use because it did not affect the market for the original, but the
Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the parody was not a fair use because it
was commercial.82
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that 2 Live
Crew’s parody was a fair use because it was a transformative use of the
original work:
Suffice it to say now that parody has an obvious claim to
transformative value, as Acuff–Rose itself does not deny.
Like less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, it can
provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work,
and, in the process, creating a new one. We thus line up
with the courts that have held that parody, like other
comment or criticism, may claim fair use under § 107.83
The Supreme Court explicitly adopted Leval’s interpretation of the
fair use doctrine, including his conclusion that the first fair use factor is the
most important and that the doctrine requires transformativeness.84
Specifically, it held that parody could be transformative because “it can
provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the
process, creating a new one.”85 The Court observed, “Parody needs to
mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the
creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire
can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of
borrowing.”86 So, copying in order to create a parody is a fair use because
parody requires copying. Or rather, copying is fair use only if it is justified.
And when is copying justified? Apparently, when the new work is
sufficiently valuable:
If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical bearing
on the substance or style of the original composition, which
the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid
the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to
fairness in borrowing from another’s work diminishes
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 573.
Id.
Id.; Acuff–Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F. 2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992).
Acuff–Rose, 510 U.S. at 579.
Id. at 578–79.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 580–81.
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accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like
the extent of its commerciality, loom larger.87
In other words, copying is a fair use only if it adds something
valuable to the original. And that does not include something of commercial
value, which implies that fair use requires adding something of aesthetic
value.
Of course, the Supreme Court explicitly disclaimed any aesthetic
element to the fair use analysis, citing Bleistein, “The threshold question
when fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether a parodic character
may reasonably be perceived. Whether, going beyond that, parody is in
good taste or bad does not and should not matter to fair use.”88 But in the
very next paragraph, it provided a remarkably patronizing description of the
transformative aspects of 2 Live Crew’s work of authorship:
While we might not assign a high rank to the parodic
element here, we think it fair to say that 2 Live Crew’s
song reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the
original or criticizing it, to some degree. 2 Live Crew
juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy
comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for
sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The
later words can be taken as a comment on the naiveté of the
original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that
ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it
signifies. It is this joinder of reference and ridicule that
marks off the author’s choice of parody from the other
types of comment and criticism that traditionally have had
a claim to fair use protection as transformative works.89
So, 2 Live Crew’s parody of “Oh, Pretty Woman” was sufficiently
transformative to qualify as a fair use but not to escape the Supreme Court’s
ridicule. Apparently, courts should not consider the aesthetic value of
allegedly transformative uses, except to poke fun at them. Of course, 2 Live
Crew sold nearly 250,000 copies of “Pretty Woman” before Acuff–Rose
even filed its infringement action and sold many more copies afterward, so
many consumers plainly found it aesthetically valuable.90 In any case,
Campbell leaves the distinct impression that 2 Live Crew’s parody is a
protected fair use only on the Supreme Court’s sufferance. One wonders
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 580.
Id. at 582.
Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
Id. at 573.
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whether the Supreme Court would have even recognized the transformative
aspects of a subtler parody.
The Court’s dismissive assessment of 2 Live Crew’s work
illustrates a troubling consequence of reliance on transformativeness. As
Andrew Gilden has observed, the open-ended nature of the
transformativeness test tends to disadvantage marginalized authors, because
courts are less likely to recognize the aesthetic value of their contribution.91
The transformativeness analysis increasingly relies on a raw material
metaphor that favors artists seen by courts as cooking or recontextualizing
the material they incorporate into their work, rather than using it in its raw
form.92 This raw versus cooked dichotomy subtly encourages courts to
privilege certain kinds of uses over others. While courts are increasingly
willing to find that rich and fabulous appropriation artists have transformed
the works that they copy by cooking the raw materials of culture, they are
less willing to pardon lesser-known artists.93 In other words, courts
unconsciously respond to social cues. While blue-chip artists like Prince
and Koons have mounted successful fair use defenses based on
recontextualization, socially marginalized authors are typically less
successful.94
As a consequence, Amy Adler has argued that courts should
abandon the transformativeness test entirely, at least in relation to works
created by visual artists, who routinely use original elements of existing
works of authorship without transforming them in any of the ways
contemplated by the fair use doctrine.95 While such uses create new
meanings, they do so by changing the context in which those works are
presented rather than changing the works themselves. Adler suggests that
the fair use inquiry should turn on whether the allegedly infringing work
negatively affects the market for the original work.
By contrast, Laura Heymann has argued that transformativeness
should depend on consumer perceptions rather than authorial intent.96 In
other words, courts should find that an allegedly infringing work is
transformative if consumers perceive it as different from the copied work,
irrespective of the intentions of the author of the work.97 Of course, as
Heymann recognizes, this reformulation of the transformativeness test
91. Andrew Gilden, Raw Materials and the Creative Process, 104 GEO. L.J. 355, 357
(2016).
92. See, e.g., Acuff–Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 75, at 1111).
93. Gilden, supra note 91, at 370.
94. Id.
95. Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U.L. REV. 559, 564 (2016).
96. Laura A. Heymann, Everything is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response,
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 455 (2008).
97. Id.
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approaches a market-based approach to fair use, but differs insofar as it
asks whether a work has created a new “discursive community” based on
the alleged infringer’s unique contributions.98
IV. OBJECTIVE TRANSFORMATION
I believe that courts may be able to avoid many of the problems
associated with the fair use doctrine by explicitly applying the aesthetic
nondiscrimination doctrine to the transformativeness test. In other words,
transformativeness should be an objective inquiry. When courts ask
whether an allegedly infringing work transforms the work it copies, they
should only ask whether the two works are different, not whether the
defendant has added anything valuable. As the Supreme Court recognized
in Bleistein, courts are ill suited to determine whether an original element of
a work of authorship has any aesthetic value.99 They are equally ill suited to
determine whether the use of an element of a work of authorship has any
aesthetic value. As currently formulated, the transformativeness test
implicitly requires courts to evaluate the aesthetic value of allegedly
transformative uses, a task they cannot accomplish without discriminating
against marginalized authors and uses of works of authorship that judges do
not understand or value.
Of course, applying the aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine to the
transformativeness test would dramatically reduce the scope of the
derivative works right.100 If transformativeness only requires difference,
then the overwhelming majority of uses are transformative and the
derivative works right becomes almost meaningless. But this is probably for
the best.
Under the economic theory, copyright protection is justified only if
it provides a salient incentive to marginal authors. The derivative works
right provides a salient incentive to the extent that it provides an exclusive
right to create adaptations of the original work, like sequels and versions in
different media. But trademark and unfair competition law can also provide
these salient incentives. By contrast, the derivative works right rarely if
ever provides a salient incentive to the extent that it provides an exclusive
right to use elements of the original work to create different works because
authors typically cannot anticipate such uses. Effectively, the derivative
works right limits or prevents the creation and distribution of works of
authorship that the public values. As a consequence, the derivative works
right is largely unjustified and should be eliminated.
98. Id. at 465.
99. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903).
100. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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V. MUSICAL WORKS AND COMPULSORY LICENSES
The music industry provides an excellent illustration of how the
derivative works right has limited or prevented the creation of valuable
works of authorship in other media. Recorded music typically consists of
two copyrightable works: the sound recording and the underlying musical
work.101 The sound recording is a derivative work of the musical work,
because it copies some or all of the original elements of the musical work
and adds new original elements.
Typically, the derivative works right provides that an author cannot
create and distribute a derivative work based on a copyrighted work without
the permission of the copyright owner.102 But the compulsory licensing
system for musical works provides that an author may create and distribute
a sound recording of a copyrighted musical work without the permission of
the copyright owner for a nominal fee after the copyright owner has
authorized the creation and distribution of the first sound recording.103
As a consequence, many musicians record and distribute covers,
which are sound recordings of copyrighted musical works. The most
frequently recorded popular song may be George Gershwin’s
“Summertime,” as a group of collectors have identified more than 30,000
recordings of the song.104 More than 7,000 musicians have recorded
versions of the song “Amazing Grace.”105 And more than 1,000 musicians
have recorded versions of Joni Mitchell’s song “Both Sides Now.”106
The demand for covers of musical works shows that they have
social value and that the public does not perceive covers as substitutes for
the musical work. On the contrary, covers of musical works typically
increase the value of the underlying musical work and complement the
value of each other, even if they are very similar. For example, Dan Penn
and Chips Moman co-wrote the song “The Dark End of the Street” in

101. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) & (7) (2012).
102. Id. See also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5680.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 115.
104. THE SUMMERTIME CONNECTION, http://summertime-connection.nl/
[https://perma.cc/MWK3-DLHC] (last visited July 15, 2016).
105. Noah Berlatsky, From “Sweet Home Chicago” to “Yesterday,” the Most-Covered
Songs in History, SALON.COM (July 26, 2014, 10:00 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2014/07/26/from_sweet_home_chicago_to_yesterday_the_most_cove
red_songs_in_history/ [https://perma.cc/FZD6-VQ7Y].
106. Known Recordings of ‘Both Sides Now’, JONI MITCHELL,
http://jonimitchell.com/music/covers-song.cfm?id=Both%20Sides%20Now
[http://perma.cc/3MP7-HV7C] (last visited July 15, 2016).
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1966.107 James Carr recorded the first version of the song, which was
released in 1967.108 Soon afterward, Percy Sledge recorded a version of the
song, which was also released in 1967.109 Even though the Carr and Sledge
versions of the song are similar in many respects, both were popular and
successful.110 The arrangements are slightly different, and the performances
reflect the distinctive personalities of their respective singers. In 1969,
Clarence Carter recorded a rather salty version of the song with an
extensive spoken introduction, and the Flying Burrito Brothers recorded a
version in a country rock style.111 In 1972, Ry Cooder recorded a soulinfluenced version of the song, performed at a slower tempo.112 And many
other musicians have also recorded versions of the song, each of which
have appealed to different audiences in different ways.113 In other words,
the evidence shows that the public benefits from the creation of covers and
does not perceive covers as substitutes for the original musical work.
In the absence of the compulsory licensing system, the owner of the
copyright in a musical work could limit or prohibit the creation of covers.
While that would benefit the authors of popular musical works, it would
certainly reduce the production of covers. Indeed, some authors have
indicated that they would prohibit covers of their musical works.114 The
mechanical license benefits the public by preventing the authors of musical
works from inefficiently exercising derivative works rights.
Of course, the compulsory licensing system itself is flawed because
it does not apply to derivative works that substantially alter the underlying
work:
A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a
musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to
conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the
performance involved, but the arrangement shall not
change the basic melody or fundamental character of the
107. See Barney Hoskyns, Lives of the great songs / Cheatin’ meeting of minds: The
Dark End of the Street, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 8, 1994), http://www.independent.co.uk/artsentertainment/lives-of-the-great-songs-cheatin-meeting-of-minds-the-dark-end-of-the-street1398917.html [https://perma.cc/3U2B-75LL].
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. E.g., Prince. Eriq Gardner, Why Taylor Swift May Soon Be Able to Stop Cover
Songs on Spotify Too, BILLBOARD.COM (Feb. 6, 2015),
http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6465293/why-taylor-swift-may-soon-be-able-tostop-cover-songs-on-spotify-too [https://perma.cc/BJJ2-9U2X].
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work, and shall not be subject to protection as a derivative
work under this title, except with the express consent of the
copyright owner.115
As a consequence, while the compulsory licensing system reduces
the inefficiency of the derivative works right, it still prevents the creation of
many derivative works without permission. Ironically, it actually facilitates
the creation of derivative works that are similar to the original work and
more likely to function as market substitutes, but discourages the creation
of derivative works that are different from the original and less likely to
function as market substitutes.
In any case, the popularity of covers facilitated by the compulsory
licensing system suggests the extent to which the derivative works right has
negatively impacted the ability of authors to create derivative and nonsubstituting works with substantial social value. Indeed, consumers
typically prefer generic and familiar works of authorship, suggesting that
the derivative works right may impose substantial social costs.116 The
application of the aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine to the
transformativeness test would drastically reduce the scope of the derivative
works right and promote the creation of many socially valuable works,
without affecting any of the salient incentives that copyright provides to
marginal authors.
CONCLUSION
The aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine should apply to both the
subject matter of copyright and the subject matter of fair use. If courts
should ignore the aesthetic value of a work of authorship when determining
whether it is protected by copyright, they should also ignore the aesthetic
value of transformative uses of that work of authorship. What’s sauce for
the goose is sauce for the gander. The purpose of copyright is to promote
the creation of works of authorship with social value, but the current
iteration of the fair use doctrine permits inefficient assertions of the
derivative works right. An objective version of the transformativeness test
would reduce the scope of the derivative works right and increase the
efficiency of copyright doctrine.

115. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
116. See Heymann, supra note 96, at 465.

